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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 3(a), Utah R. 
App. P. and Utah Code Ann, sec. 78-2a-3(2)(d) 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The legal issue presented for review is one of first 
impression in the State of Utah: After a tenant has given notice 
of leaving, does the act of a landlord, who believes the tenant is 
behind in the rent, in serving said tenant a notice to pay or 
vacate, without more, constitute a wrongful eviction, even though 
the rent may have been paid, since the eviction notice sets forth 
various alternatives and it was the tenant who chose to vacate the 
premi ses. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Only one question of law is on review in this case. In 
deciding whether the trial court property granted judgment as a 
matter of law to the prevailing party, the appellate court gives no 
deference to the trial court's view of the law, the appellate court 
reviews it for correctness. See, e.g., Ron Case Roofing and 
Asphalt, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P. 2nd 1382 (Utah 1989). 
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CITATION TO THE RECORD 
Citations to the record herein will be as follows: "R" 
followed by the page number ( and a paragraph number, if 
appropriate ) in the record where the reference can be located. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: 
This appeal is from a final judgment and order of the Third 
Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department, State of 
Utah. The case arose from the following background. Plaintiff was 
leasing property from Defendant, under an oral month to month 
tenency, to operate an antique shop in Salt Lake City. R. at 2, 
paragraph 5. In September of 1991 Plaintiff notified Defendant by 
letter of Plaintiff's dissatisfaction of the premises and 
Plaintiff's probable leaving by" November 21 of 1991. R. at 19. 
Unbeknown to Defendant, Plaintiff was negotiating for other rental 
space for some period of time prior to November 20, 1991. R. at 
152, Deposition of Ken Hines, pgs. 11 and 12. By letter dated 
November 19, 1991, Plaintiff gave Defendant official Notice that 
Plaintiff was vacating the premises on or before December 21, 1991. 
R. at 20. Believing that Plaintiff had not paid rent for the 
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remaining month and that only the deposit remained, Defendant 
telephoned Plaintiff and then sent a faxed letter to Plaintiff 
along with a Notice to pay or vacate on November 20, 1991. R. at 
21 and R. at 210. It is Plaintiff's position that it had pre-paid 
rent through December 21, 1991. R. at 158 and 159. It is 
Defendant's position that Plaintiff had not pre-paid his rent. R. 
at 13, paragraph 5. Plaintiff responded to Defendant's Notice to 
pay or vacate by letter dated November 21, 1991, claiming that the 
rent was pre-paid, and added explicit language to not touch or move 
Plaintiff's merchandise which would disrupt Plaintiff's business. 
R. at 22 and 23. Defendant responded to Plaintiff's November 21, 
1991 letter, by letter dated November 26, 1991, and accepted 
Plaintiff's notice to vacate the premises by December 21, 1991. R. 
at 24, 70 and 71. Plaintiff respond by letter dated November 27, 
1991. In said letter Plaintiff references a lease with a third 
party and scheduled "... move for as soon as possible..." R. at 25. 
Plaintiff did enter into an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Lease Agreement with John F. Tern dated November 21, 1991. R. 98 
thru 104. Plaintiff claims the have started moving upon receipt of 
the Notice to pay or vacate. R. at 256. Plaintiff vacated the 
leased premises on December 16, 1991. R. at 72 and 106. Plaintiff 
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could have stayed in the premises until December 21, 1991. R. at 
78. Plaintiff did not return the keys to Defendant until January 
of 1992. R. at 209 and 175-176. 
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that the Notice to pay or vacate 
constitutes a constructive or wrongful eviction; that it would not 
have left the premises when it did if the notice had not been 
served; that it suffered damages as a result of the wrongful 
eviction and that punitive damages should be assessed against 
defendant. R. at pp. 1-5. 
Defendant's Answer denies that the Notice to pay or vacate 
constituted a constructive or wrongful eviction; that Plaintiff had 
intended to move prior to the Notice being served; that Plaintiff 
remained, or could have remained, in the premises until December 
21, 1991; that Plaintiff has suffered no damages and Defendant 
should be awarded their costs in defending Plaintiff's action, 
including reasonable attorneys fees under U.C.A. Sec 78-27-56, 1953 
as amended. 
B. Course of Proceeding and Disposition 
A Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by Defendant arguing, 
inter al ia, that the service of a Notice to pay rent or vacate upon 
a tenant who is believed to be in default in its rental obligation 
4 
cannot constitute a wrongful eviction. The court ultimately 
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment expressly ruling as 
follows: 
" Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted and Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with 
prejudice on the basis that, as a matter of law, service 
of a notice to pay rent or vacate cannot, without more, 
constitute a wrongful eviction, even though the rent may 
have been paid, since the eviction notice sets forth 
various alternatives and it is plaintiff who chose to 
quit the premises." R. at pgs 340 and 341. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant has reiterated certain facts previously contained in 
their Statement of the Case, under the above heading. Appellant 
has failed to include certain facts relevant to the lower court's 
evaluation in interpreting the law based on the facts. 
Rather than not responding to appellant's basic facts or 
asking the reader to re-read the prior Statement of the Case, 
appellee here lists the basic facts relevant to this appeal as 
follows: 
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1.. Plaintiff was leasing the subject property from Defendant 
to conduct a retail business. R. at 157; R. at 2, paragraph 5. 
2. Plaintiff gave Defendant two (2) prior letter notices 
that Plaintiff intended to leave by either November 21, or December 
21, 1991 R. at 19 and 20. 
3. On November 20, 1991, after phone conversations with 
Plaintiff, Defendant wrote Plaintiff a letter of response and 
explanation and served Plaintiff with a Notice to pay or vacate the 
premisses, R at 210 ( See Exhibit A ), R. at 21 and R. at 70, 
paragraph 4. 
4. At the time the letter was written and the Notice to pay 
or vacate was served, Defendant believed Plaintiff owed rent. R. 
at 21, 71, 71. Plaintiff believed that no rent was due and owing. 
R. at 158-159. 
5. In response to the Notice to quit, Plaintiff wrote 
Defendant a letter and claims to have started moving its inventory 
from the premises. R. at 22 and 23, R. at 256. 
6. Plaintiff did not vacate the premises until at least 
December 16, 1991. R. at 72 and 106. 
7. Plaintiff could have stayed in the premises until 
December 21, 1991. R. at 24. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Service of a Notice to pay rent or vacate upon a tenant who 
has already given notice of leaving and is believed to owe rent, 
without more, does not constitutes a constructive or wrongful 
eviction if the tenant responds to the Notice to pay or vacate by 
vacating the premises. 
The Notice to pay or vacate gives the tenant alternatives. 
Tenant could have paid or shown the landlord that the rent was 
paid, and not vacate, or vacate, In this case the tenant did make 
claim of pre-payment of rent and stayed until at least December 16, 
but claims to have vacated. A landlord should not be held liable 
for any claimed damages under such circumstances. 
ARGUMENT 
For constructive eviction to occur, the claimant tenant must 
show: 
1- That the act of the landlord interfered with the tenants 
enjoyment of the premises, 
2- That the intention of the landlord was to deprive the 
tenant of possession or permanently to interfere with tenants 
beneficial use or enjoyment of the premises, and 
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3- That the tenant Immediately moved. See 49 Am Jur. 2d, 317 
Section 302, Landlord and Tenant and Lindenberg v. MacDonald, 34 
Cal 2d 678, 214 P2d 5. In accord are Burgger v. Fonoti, 645 P2d 
647 ( Utah 1982 ) and Kenyon v. Regan, 826 P2d 140, 142 ( Utah 
App. 1992 ), cited by appellant. In the Utah cases cited by the 
appellant, the tenants were unable to prove constructive eviction 
because the criteria for constructive eviction were not met. 
Although the issues presented by this case have not been 
decided in Utah before, other jurisdictions have determined that a 
mere notice to a tenant to quit, followed by the tenant vacating 
the premises, is not of itself sufficient to constitute an eviction 
and give the tenant a right to damages. See Lindenberg v. 
MacDonald, supra. 
The issue presented in this case is: Does the act of a 
landlord who serves a notice to pay or vacate upon a tenant, 
without more, constitute a constructive eviction, when the tenant 
moves, even though the rent may have been paid. The trial court 
ruled that, the act of the landlord serving a notice to pay or 
vacate upon the tenant, without more, is not a constructive 
eviction, even though the tenant moved and even if the rent had 
been paid, because the notice sets forth alternatives and it is the 
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tenant who chose to quit the premises. 
Appellant raises the question of "...who should bear the risk 
of an improper notice to quit?"..., and then answers the question 
by saying the landlord. The reasoning offered in that a tenant 
should not be required to chose between..." (1) staying on the 
premises and hoping that it is correct in believing that the rent 
has been paid, or (2) leaving the premises in order to avoid the 
treats of the three day notice."... The appellant then uses the 
tort principle of the."..one who sets in motion the forces which 
cause the harm will be held responsible..." as an analogy. 
Applying the appellant's analogy to this case, the court below 
came to a different conclusion. One of the facts different in the 
lower courts decision and the appellants question to this Court is 
the question of whether the notice was improper to start with. 
Appellant states it was improper. The lower court makes no such 
distinction. 
The facts of this case show that the tenant (appellant) had 
given written notice to the landlord (appellee), of tenant leaving 
by either November 21 or December 21. Believing that money already 
paid by the tenant was deposit money for damages should the 
premises not be in satisfactory condition upon the tenant leaving, 
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the landlord telephoned the tenant and then gave the tenant a 
letter of explanation and a Notice to pay the unpaid rent for the 
remaining period or vacate the premises. The letter and Notice 
were faxed and served on November 20, 1991. On November 21, 1991, 
tenant wrote the landlord saying that the rent had been paid, and 
to not attempt to move any of tenants merchandise. Rather than 
fight with the tenant, the landlord responded by accepting tenant's 
letter of leaving by December 21, 1991, which obviated the prior 
Notice. 
The Notice to pay or vacate came after communication between 
the parties over a legitimate dispute over the rent and was not 
improper. Appellee believes the lower court recognized that fact 
with the inclusion of the words ".. without more,.." in the lower 
court1s deci sion. 
Continuing appellants analogy but reversing the parties, 
appellant actually started the motion which caused the harm 
claimed. Tenant sent the landlord a letter stating that tenant was 
leaving. The landlord was forced to make a choice of either (1) 
using the deposit money already paid as rent money and hope there 
would be no damages to the premises when the tenant left, or (2) 
asking for further rent money for the remaining rent period unless 
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the tenant left immediately. 
The claim by appellant that the tenant should not be required 
to make choices is also applicable to tenant not requiring the 
landlord to make choices. Is it not just as reasonable to claim 
that the landlord should not be forced to make a choice by the 
tenant, rather that saying the tenant should not be forced to make 
a choice by the landlord? This tenant was not inexperienced, 
uneducated, unsophisticated or financially unable to seek legal 
help. In fact tenant had legal help and responded with such during 
the three day notice period. Tenant was given the right to stay 
and did stay twenty-six (26) days beyond the date of the Notice. 
The tenant could have stayed the full month but chose not to. The 
claimed fact that tenant started to move almost immediately when 
the tenant could have stayed the full of the remaining month, is 
not compelling that a constructive eviction occurred. 
The law should place the risk on the tenant, who uses the 
deposit money as rent money, leaving the landlord without security 
should the premises be left damaged. It makes no sense for the 
landlord to be saddled with the tenant's negligent use of the 
deposit money, or even worse, the intentional wrongful use of the 
deposit money. 
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In the present case, after tenant gave notice of terminating 
the lease within 30 days, the landlord was forced to either accept 
the deposit money already paid as rent and risk the loss should 
damages have occurred, or ask for further rent should the tenant 
not leave immediately. The appellant asks this Court to consider 
the act of the landlord giving the tenant a Notice to pay or vacate 
under the recited circumstances as a basis for a claim of 
constructive eviction, even when the tenant did not immediately 
move but does claim to have immediately started moving. 
Appellant says other jurisdictions lend support to such 
claims. The cited care of Dobbins v. Paul , 321 S.E. 2d 540 (N.C. 
App.. 1984) has facts considerably different than this case. In 
the Dobbi ns case the tenant was not leaving nor had given notice of 
leaving but had just moved in. The landlord gave no option to the 
tenant as in this case, but required immediate removal with no 
option to pay rent. The Routal Corp., N.W., Inc. v. Ottati, 391 
So. 2d 308 (Fla. App. 1980) case is also distinguishable from this 
case. In the Routal case there was a written lease not yet fully 
performed and again no option in the notice to pay rent and stay. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee defendant submits that this Court should follow the 
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lower court's decision, particularly in this fact situation, and 
allow to stand the granting of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the basis that , as a matter of law, service of a 
notice to pay rent or vacate cannot, without more, constitute a 
wrongful eviction, even though the rent may have been paid, since 
the notice sets forth various alternatives and it is the tenant who 
chose the quit the premises. 
Further, the order of the trial court requiring plaintiff to 
pay costs should not be reversed. 
DATED this 7 day of A p r i l , 1994 
'(xAah^L^fi • La^vY^y^-
rtCHftftfr-N. CANNON 
Attorney for Defendant- Appel 1 ee 
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APPENDIX 
The letter dated November 20, 1991 from Defendant to 
Plaintiff Exhibit A 
N A T U R A L 
NOVEMBEP 20, 1991 
DICK BARTON 
CALIFORNIA PACKAGING/AKA SQUIRES ANTIQUES 
FAX 1-310-698-0998 
DEAR DICKj 
IN ANSWER TO YOUR FAX OP NOV. 19, 1991; AND YOUR PHONE CALL OF TODAY THE FOLLOWINGJ 
1) WHEN YOU MOVED IN YOU PAID $10,500.00} SINCE THAT TIME YOU HAVE PAID 
SIXTY DAYS IN ADVANCE (APPROX,). NOW, YOU WANT TO MOVE WITHOUT MAKING 
ANY FURTHER PAYMENT, ON DEC. 21, 1991. SHOULD WE ALLOW THAT, YOU WILL 
HAVE STAYED USING THE DEPOSIT AS RENT,,..THAT CAN NOT BE. 
2) WE WOULD BE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE A 6 MONTH LEASE WITH YOU, EVEN THOUGH 
WHEN YOU MOVED IN YOUR PROPOSAL WAS 3 YEARS ON A LEASE AFTER 3 MONTHS OF 
RENTING. HOWEVER, THE RATE WOULD BE "$3,500.00" NOT THE $2,800.00/MO. 
YOU HAVE OFFERED. 
3) AT THIS TIME ONLY TWO ITEMS OF ADJUSTMENT COME TO MIND ONE BEING 
THE UNAUTHORIZED PAINTING OF THE FRONT DOOR, WITH BLACK PAINT THE 
OTHER IS THE LOSS OF THE 'TOR LEASE" SIGN. BUT, AN INSPECTION OF THE 
PROPERTY WILL BE REQUIRED AFTER YOU HAVE VACATED TO BE ABLE TO DETERMIN 
IF THERE ARE ADDITIONAL CHARGES DUE. 
PLEASE NOTE THE ATTACHED NOTICE, WHICH IS IN LINE WITH YOUR STATEMENT REGARDING, 
"COURTS AND ATTORNEYS". THERE IS NO DESIRE TO ACQUAINT OURSELVES WITH THE LEGAL 
PROCESS, IN TACT WE WOULD RATHER YOU STAY. 
ANY RESPONCE SHOULD REACH US BY NOT LATER THAN MONDAY NOVEMBER 25, 1991 BY "NOON" 
OUR TIME. HOPEFULLY, IT WILL BE A COPY OF A LEASE OR YOUR LATE RENT PAYMENT. A 
LEASE WOULD, OF COURSE BE YOUR PROPOSAL AND WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED AND BE 
ACCEPTABLE TO US. 
SINCEREIY, 
MIKE BILANZICH 
PRESIDENT 
MB/tb 
455 East South Temple Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 (801) 363-8811 
Toll Free Numbers: Outside SL Metro 1-800-826-0581; Outside Utah t-800-453-5682 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF to be mailed, postage pre-paid, on this " day 
of April, 1994, to: 
John W. Holt, Esq. 
WINDER 4 HASLAM, P.C. 
175 West 200 South, #4000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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